Ukraine Blog 43 – Nukes and Luka (again)
Dear friends, family and colleagues,
Today was
the most important day since November 9th, 1989, the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Tsar Putin annexed four Ukrainian Oblasts into the Russian Federation.
However, the annexation was not the main message of Putin’s speech of little
under an hour. The main message was that we, in the West, are LGTBI loving
Satanists that are enemies of the world. In typical tragicomical Russian
fashion, all of this was happening while Russia is suffering its second major
military defeat in three weeks around the town of Lyman.
While Ukraine
has complete initiative on the battlefield and is making lighting gains and we
will likely see an increase of hybrid warfare against the West, there are two
things we need to talk about: Nukes (again) and Luka(shenko) (also again).
A. The Nukes
A lot of
you came to me with utter fear in their eyes that now finally the moment has
come that Putin will use the nukes. Well, I believe two things:
1. Putin is absolutely willing to use nuclear
weapons in combat
2. Yes, the risk of deployment of nuclear
weapons is increasing and bigger than on February 24th.
Having said
that. I think we’re still far off from the moment that it’s rational (and yes, he’s
still very much acting rational) for Putin to use a nuclear weapon. To understand
this, we have to look at two things: Putin’s psychology and how the deployment
process of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons work.
1. Putin’s psychology:
I studied Vladimir
Putin for over twenty years and I know that he will absolutely use a nuclear
weapon when he’s absolutely sure that it will help him to stay in power. The
current state is that when he uses a nuclear weapon right now, he will most
likely lose power. NATO has made clear that in case Putin uses tactical nukes
on the territory of Ukraine (both as a demonstration and on the battlefield),
it will respond with a multi-day massive conventional strategic and tactical
bombing campaign obliterating all Russian military presence in Russian-occupied
Ukraine and effectively establishing the no-fly zone Ukraine has requested for
a long time. And that’s the point: Russia’s military is so weak right now, that
it can easily be engaged and destroyed with NATO’s conventional military might.
A quick total NATO dominance in Ukraine and the defeat of Russian forces there
will hasten Putin’s downfall, it will not prolong his power and he knows it. In
addition, after the massacres of Bucha and Izyum came to light, there’s little
appetite for the Ukrainians to surrender even after nuclear weapons have been
deployed. If they surrender, they cease to exist. Even under a nuclear mushroom
cloud, many Ukrainians will still survive and fight.
Putin has a
very complex personality and there are many angles. However, what’s clear above
all: the value of a human life means very little to him. The thousands of Russian
soldiers that are currently being finished off by the Ukrainian army around
Lyman and he’s losing territory: he simply doesn’t care. As long as he can
project his idea, “the West is evil and Russia is acting of Russia is good and
sacred,” successfully on at least a part of the population, his hunger for
power and recognition is fulfilled.
The most
potent signal that Putin is still acting rationally and utterly fears the
Russian population came in this video yesterday.
'Mistakes need to be corrected': Putin admits military mobilisation errors - YouTube
In the
speech he admits that mistakes are being made and that corrections needs to be
made. However, the admission of mistakes is not the main message in this video.
It shows two things:
1. Yes, Putin ordered the mobilization,
but it was executed by incompetent officials. Putin as a “concerned leader who
*kuch* cares for his people” sees that mistakes are being made and he as all-knowing and responsible leader steps in to fix them. This is the same old trick
he uses for years: yes, hard measures need to be taken, but my subordinates
mess it up, so I will save you. This is done by many dictators from the new
generation. Aleksandar Vučić, the president of Serbia is a master in it.
2. It shows that Putin is really afraid
of the reaction of the Russian public and he acts swiftly to mitigate any
discomfort in the civilian ranks. Thanks to the approach described under 1. He will
get away with it for now.
But nothing
lasts forever. Like I said in the previous blog, the lid of Pandora’s box is now
gone. We are now less than 10 days in the mobilization and even according to a
Pro-Kremlin poll, support for Russia’s war is decreasing fast.
Russians 'Anxious, Scared, Horrified' By Mobilization, Latest Poll Says (rferl.org)
My prediction
is that there will be a point that he can’t hide the fact anymore that there’s
only one person responsible for ALL major decisions in Russia, which is
Vladimir Putin. At such a point he simply needs a military victory fast and
since his downfall is nearing, it will actually be rational for him to deploy
nuclear weapons. But other factors come into play at that stage. Let’s have a look
at the nuclear deployment process.
2. Nuclear Deployment Procedure:
Strategic
Nuclear Weapons:
It’s a
common misconception that the president of a nuclear power can launch strategic
nuclear weapons with the push on a red button like the villains in James Bond
movies. It’s actually quite an elaborate process with quite some steps that
need to be taken.
1. Putin orders a strike with strategic
nuclear weapons like intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM’s) or submarined
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s). Putin will send out the order via the
famous black briefcase.
2. Verification: there’s actually not one
briefcase, but the minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff,
Valery Gerasimov, also have a briefcase. They will receive the order, and both
need to verify with a code that the order actually comes from Putin.
3. Preparation of the launch codes:
after the minister of defense and chief of staff approve the order, the
confirmation will be sent to strategic missile command. There the launch codes
will be generated. These are codes that serves as authentication and to unlock
the missiles for use by the crews in the silo’s, mobile launchers and
submarines.
4. After the codes are sent to the
launch crews, the crews need to verify the codes whether they are indeed authentic.
Prior to shifts, predesignated launch codes have been put in special safes.
Only with the right code it’s possible to open safe with launch key. Without
one of the two components, launch codes or launch key, it will not be possible
to launch the missiles.
These
processes work the same for the United States and Russia and have been
formalized in the START treaties. This means that there are many checks and balances
that need to be taken order for a launch to happen. In case Putin is that desperate,
I think that either Shoigu or Gerasimov will already block the order. Everybody
who’s involved in the launch process of ICBM’s and SLBM’s knows that when the order
is given and there’s no incoming attack, it WILL be the end of everything they know.
There’s reason to believe that Putin’s actions are not particularly popular within
the Strategic Rocket Forces right now. Apparently, some units have been drafted
to fight on the battlefield in Ukraine, since some badges of the unit have been
found among dead Russian soldiers.
While it’s
a waste of valuable knowledge and expertise I can imagine when their colleagues
who are left behind get a hold on this, they won’t be eager to launch some missiles
in a global Armageddon.
What also
gives me hope is that people who presented themselves as lunatics on Russian state
television, like RT’s head, Margarita Simonyan, who once said she would be
happy to go to heaven in a cloud of nuclear smoke, is suddenly very concerned about
her friends and relatives being send to the frontlines.
In short: although
the majority of strategic nuclear weapons is always combat ready (also in the
United States!), the elaborate checks, makes me confident that a launch of
these horrible weapons will never happen.
Tactical
Nuclear Weapons:
The
situation is the other way around with tactical nuclear weapons. Just to be clear:
when commentators speak about the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the
Ukrainian war, it’s about these weapons. There’s no difference in the warhead
and the payload. A nuke is a nuke. The difference is in the delivery vehicle. As
opposed to ICBM’s and SLBM’s, tactical nukes, are launched by short range missiles,
artillery shells or aircraft bombs. There are no elaborate procedures for the
launch. As soon as a tactical nuclear weapon is mounted on the delivery
vehicle, the operator can do anything with it.
As opposed
to strategic nuclear weapons, NO Russian tactical nuclear weapons are deployed.
They are stored in specially secured storage facilities that are under constant
surveillance of Western spy satellites. While it would in theory be possible to
smuggle one or two tactical nukes outside of such a facility, any large scale
movement would immediately be noticed by spy satellites or surveillance teams
on the ground.
I’m convinced
right now that in case the Americans do observe any movement of which they have
not been notified of (movements of tactical nukes should be reported to
another), the Americans will carry out a preventive conventional strikes on
such convoys. They reality is that Russia’s air defense is very weak now, since
many S-300 units have been sent to Ukraine to operate in a surface-to-surface
role to bomb Ukrainian cities.
This is the
part what the Western leaders talk about when they don’t see a change in Russia’s
nuclear posture. There’s no trucks or trains moving around these facilities. It’s
noticeable that there are many U.S. surveillance planes flying around Russia,
but I haven’t seen any contingency flights on FlightRadar24. For now: all is
quiet.
So, looking
at both Putin’s psychology and the launch procedures: by the time he decides to
use a nuclear weapon, it’s most likely too late for him and his orders will be
obstructed, or tactical nukes will be destroyed on the way to the deployment areas.
B. Luka
As I wrote
in my previous blog, I’m not worried about the mobilized Russian civilians (Mobiks).
However, I’m a bit concerned when it comes to the combination of Mobiks and
Lukashenko.
After
months of absence, there are again reports that airfields, train tracks and gathering
points are being prepared in Belarus. Lukashenko was in Sochi a couple of days
ago to meet Putin and I think it’s highly likely that Putin told him: “If I go
down, you go with me.” According to initial reports, Russia will send around
20.000 Mobiks to Belarus.
Although I
don’t think they will stand a chance against even Ukrainian territorial defense
units, which have proven to be on par with Russian regular forces in the
battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychans'k, it would mean that the Ukrainian
armed forces again have to allocate resources to the northern front. This will
most likely highly impact current counteroffensives in the East and South.
There’s one
other concern and one big opportunity that I see:
The train
transports that bring heavy equipment start to contain lighter and much older
equipment. I think Russia is seriously nearing the bottom of what’s available
in the equipment storages. Entire brigades of Mobiks are only equipped with
World War II trucks and jeeps and acting solely as light infantry. The concern
that I see, is that Belarus still has huge stocks of relatively modern heavy
equipment and ammunition. I think that Putin is seriously eying to snatch the
equipment stores of Lukashenko. Ultimately the Ukrainians will make scrap metal
of it, but it might prolong the war at least for a couple of months.
However,
there’s also a big opportunity. Oleksii Arestovych, advisor to the Ukrainian president
made it clear that in case Belarus is again used as a launch path for aggression
against Ukraine, Ukraine will respond.
Arestovych
is known for his sometimes bold statements, but during the initial invasion,
the Ukrainians didn’t had HIMARS and long range Western 155 mm artillery. Right
now, there are more than 200 and more are on the way. It's now viable that
Ukraine will strike Belarus with HIMARS in case of further aggression. However,
I always made it clear that strategic victory for Ukraine, means, recovery of
Crimea, demilitarization of Transnistria and a democratic Belarus. Since an overthrow
of Lukashenko is not a given, I see it as a real possibility that Ukraine will
invade the Belarus of Lukashenko to rid the country of him once and for all. With
this guy gone, Transnistria demilitarized and Crimea back to the motherland,
Ukraine can focus its defense solely on the eastern border.
Слава
Україні!
Niels
Comments
Post a Comment