Ukraine Blog 35 - The Potato Factor
Dear friends, family and colleagues,
The HIMARS
have a arrived and the Ukrainians did not wait a second more to put them into action.
The Russian Telegram channels I follow are absolutely going berserk with
reports of a large amount of high precision tactical strikes all across the
Donbass region that Russia occupied since 2014. The amount of updates was so
big that I had to mute them on my phone. The HIMARS truly is a superweapon. The
Russians don’t have anything that even comes close to it in terms of capabilities.
The
Ukrainians are hitting exactly hitting the targets that I expected them to
strike. Ammunition depots, vehicle motor pools and Command & Control sites
(C2). Around Izium, the HIMARS rockets took out an entire regional C2 unit.
Around Izium Russian troops have been stuck for weeks. This won’t help them.
But by far
the biggest impacts are the hits on ammunition depots. Some depots are still
burning and experiencing secondary explosions two days after being hit with the
HIMARS systems. Below footage is from Snizhne deep in Russian occupied Donbass
(and indeed the place where MH-17 was shot down)
Although
Russia is by far not running out of ammunition, they have great difficulties
getting it to the frontlines. Most of the stockpiles in the Western Military
district have been exhausted, so in order to replenish their ammo stockpiles,
they now have to get ammunition from the Eastern Military district from the far
east… or do they?
The thing
is that Putin tries to extract something beneficial from the only foreign
leader he actually can get something from, the Belarussian president Alexander
Lukashenko. The crazy president of a country famous for its potatoes and
tractors. Putin saved his regime in 2020 from large popular protests, but he
made Lukashenko to sign a contract in blood where Putin specifically mentioned
that some day Lukashenko had to return the favor. There are multiple reasons
why he’s not doing that, but before we dive into that, let’s talk a little bit
about Belarus’s intriguing dictator.
Because we
talked about him before, but we really should give Belarus more attention: what’s
going on there is as important as the war in Ukraine. During the time of the Soviet-Union,
he served as directors of various Soviet state (Sovkhoz) and collective (Kolkhoz)
farms. In those farms the director was usually responsible for ensuring that
those farms reached the targets the Soviet Communist Party has set for them.
This makes hem the ultimate role model for Soviet and post-Soviet Siloviki elite.
In the early nineties, he was appointed as the chairman of the anti-corruption committee.
This made him genuinely popular and as a result he won the only democratic
elections the Republic of Belarus has ever known.
Under the
Belarus of Lukashenko he made a silent contract with his people. He could be
the dictator in exchange for providing the people with sufficient prosperity
and development. To achieve the latter he did the following two things
1. He re-nationalized 80 percent of the
economy which largely evolves around big Soviet-style state factories like
those for tractors (Minski Autamabilny Zavod (MAZ) and Minski Traktarny Zavod
(MTZ)), fertilizer (Belaruskali and Grodno Azot) and Steel and petro-chemical
industry (Byelorussian Steel Works and Mozyr/Naftan oil refineries).
2. He made deals with Russia as far
back on the Boris Yeltsin government, where he could import and transit Russian
gas against sharply reduced tariffs in exchange for Russian influence.
As a result
the Belarus from Lukashenko looks quite different from the Eastern Europe that
most people have in their mind. Buildings are nicely renovated and painted.
Roads are in excellent condition and the country is very clean. I don’t believe
that Lukashenko was genuinely supported by more than 45 percent of the people at
the height of his popularity, but a lot of Belarussians tolerated him as long as
he could provide a good living standard.
This all
started to change in 2020. Lukashenko as a typical Soviet boomer, denied the existence
of Covid 19. It was during Covid that Lukashenko showed what he’s best at:
making ridiculous statements like that you can cure covid by drinking vodka,
eating butter or driving a tractor (Lukashenko has a deep love for tractors).
Other statements in his repertoire from long before: “It’s better to be a dictator
than to be gay” and “if someone is a lesbian, it’s a man’s fault.” The denial
of covid in itself was not the main reason for the challenge to his rule that
appeared, but helped quite a bit. The main challenge was that the usually
divided Belarussian opposition for the first time managed to put forward one
single candidate. I can write a book about the events of 2020, but fast forward,
the only reason Lukashenko is still in power, is thanks to Putin.
Although
Russia and Belarus are often portrayed as closest allies, the relationship
between Putin and Lukashenko has been very rocky to say the least. In more than
twenty years, Russia and Belarus had multiple gas wars where Russia closed off gas
to Belarus. Russia really doesn’t like that Lukashenko can benefit domestically
from cheap gas tariffs. Putin and Lukashenko also don’t like each other on a
personal level. This went so far that Russian state television once aired a
series of deeply anti-Lukashenko documentaries, called “Godbatka.” Part one can
still be seen here:
Godbatka. part1 Крестный Батька - YouTube
The title
is a mixture of “Godfather” and “Batka (Daddy).” It’s a misconception that
Batka is Lukashenko’s nickname in Belarus. Russians like to call hem that way.
Belarussians call him “Luka.” With crushing the opposition in Belarus, Putin
finally had an opportunity to bring Lukashenko in line, or at least… he thought.
Since the
fall of the Soviet-Union, Russia has desperately been trying to bring together
a military alliance to counter NATO. This alliance is called the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Since the start of the war it has become
clear that either the members are not capable or willing to support Putin. Let’s
talk about them one by one
-
Kazakhstan:
the most fierce opponent of Putin. Openly defies Putin and is blockading
Russian energy supplies
-
Armenia:
Has no land border with Russia and needs all weapons itself to defend against Azerbaijan.
-
Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan: Are completely cut off from Russia by Kazakhstan. Their armies
are very small. Interesting both armies fought two very large border clashes
with each other in the past 1,5 years.
This leaves
Belarus as the only CSTO member where Putin actually can get something from. The
thing that Putin wants most from Belarus, is the Belarussian army to join the
Russian army in their invasion of Ukraine. However, it has become clear that Belarussian
soldiers will not fight the Ukrainians. Many are very sympathetic to the
Ukrainian cause and according to multiple reports, Belarussian mothers
instructed their sons to join the Ukrainian army as soon as they set foot on
Ukrainian soil.
So no
manpower, but there’s something else that Lukashenko can give to pay off his debt
to Putin. Like Ukraine, Belarus inherited a huge stockpile of ammunition (1,5
million tons) and arms from the Red army after the Red army withdrew from the
former Warsaw Pact countries.
It’s now
reported by Belarussian railway workers (who have worked tremendously hard to
obstruct the Russians in Belarus) that Belarussian army is emptying those huge
ammunition stockpiles and is sending them to Russia.
This in my
opinion shares two purposes:
1. Russia is not critically low on
ammunition, but this ammunition is located far closer to the frontline than the
stockpiles in the far east. Besides the ammunition, I also expect Belarussian
army T-72 tanks and planes to be send to Russia. Those tanks are in quite good
shape and Russian planes are now falling from the sky outside of battlefield
areas due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance personnel.
2. The rumors that the Belarussian army
is finally so fed up with Lukashenko are becoming stronger. A coup looks
increasingly more likely. Once Lukashenko is deposed, Putin has no other option
than to intervene in Belarus. Rest assured that the Belarussian army will as fight
as hard as the Ukrainians in fighting the Russians when it comes that far. By
emptying Belarus of ammunition, Putin is making sure that the Belarussian army
will not be able to conduct large scale defense.
The
ammunition deal would be a good deal for Putin for these reasons. On the short
term it will be a good deal for Lukashenko, because he can literally buy off
the commitment of his soldiers. But I expect the resistance within the
Belarussian military to only increase.
A lot of
people where very nervous about a late night visit of Putin to the Kremlin last
night. Quite some analysts think that Putin is planning military action against
Lithuania to punish Lithuania for the blockade of the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad.
I don’t think
Lithuania has to do with this. Russia absolutely can’t fight a war against Lithuania
right now. I think it had more to on how to makes sure that Lukashenko pays off
his debt. There has been intense back and forth traffic between senior Belarussian
and Russian officials. Putin still tries to provoke Ukraine by sending missiles
to Ukraine from Belarus. He hopes Ukraine will fire back into Belarus and as such
will trigger a response from the Belarussian military.
Russia
seems to have lost all capability in actually hitting meaningful targets. Last
night they fired cruise missiles in Kyiv again and the only targets that were
hit, were civilian targets. It’s a clear sign Russia is losing militarily and
the thing that Russian usually does at that stage is blindly hitting civilian
targets.
I have a feeling
we are closely approaching the battle for freedom not only in Ukraine, but also
Belarus. A battle that’s equally important.
Слава
Україні! Жыве Беларусь! (this quote is banned by Lukashenko’s regime)
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